China does not seem to believe the existence of universally acknowledged values in science and to promote the observation of such values that should be applied to every member of the scientific community and at all times. Or, there is a separation between the practice of science in China and the values represented by modern science. In this context, science, including the pursuit of the Nobel Prize, is more a pragmatic means to achieve the end of the political leadership -the national pride in this case -than an institution laden with values that govern its practices. However, it is the recognition and respect of the latter that could lead to achievement of the former, rather than the other way around.
by the late 19th century reformers, or the predecessors of the May 4th generation, to undermine the feudal court of the Qing Dynasty: "Chinese learning is for fundamental principles (ti) while Western learning for practical applications (yong)" (zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong) with techniques merely serving the purpose of preserving the essence of the Chinese culture (Shen and Williams 2005) . In other words, the science that was appreciated during the May 4th period was not its Enlightenment values but its pragmatism or utility, or the achievement of modernization without modernity, which unfortunately delayed China's modernization endeavor (Baum 1982) .
As this approach deeply rooted in the Chinese culture values utility and practicality, those who had been trained and possessed knowledge in the natural sciences and engineering were offered important positions in areas of their expertise during the Nationalist period (Kirby 1989) . In most of the history of the People's Republic, science and technology were considered as integral and overwhelming part of nation-building, whereby members of the technical community contributed their knowledge to achieving the modernization of industry, agriculture, and national defense. There seemed to be a perfect alliance between the ti of communist ideology and the yong of modern science, although from time to time the yong had been perceived anti-ti, as in the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957, a political campaign against those with the yong or expertise who were considered to try to undermine the ti they served (Schneider 2003) . During the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals, including scientists came under unprecedented attack (Wei and Brock 2012) .
The appreciation of science as a utility was reinforced in China's reform and opendoor period (Miller 1996) . According to Deng Xiaoping, then China's paramount leader, science and technology constitute the primary productive forces, thus giving rise to a series of policy initiatives emphasizing the materialistic aspect of the science and in turn the technocratic domination in the nation's affairs. Since the 1990s, scientists have also been showered with economic incentives, academic "reputation," political access, and in some occasions, even leading government positions, in return for their advice and support of the regime (Pei 2006: 88-95) . Indeed, Chinese intellectuals have become pragmatic, willingly trading their independence and autonomy for materialistic affluence.
There are exceptions. The late astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, for example, stood to use the attention given to the yong of science to challenge the ti represented by Marxism and the Communist Party leadership. He asserted that since intellectuals represent the most primary productive forces in society, as Deng indicated, Chinese intellectuals should be the nation's new leading class, not just a social stratum. Fang further argued that the role of intellectuals should not be limited to solving technical problems but be extended to providing progress for the entire society (Williams 1990; Miller 1996) . While this turned out to be an aborted endeavor, unfortunately, Fang, the challenger to the ti-yong division, did not necessarily treat science as an institution and as a value system as well.
The issue underlying the utility of science is much deeper and philosophical in nature, dating back to Francis Bacon's maxim, "knowledge is power." In China, the advocacy of "saving the nation through science" in the Nationalist era (Wang 2002) , recent policies such as "revitalizing the nation with science, technology, and education" (kejiao xingguo) and "strengthening the nation through talent" (rencai qiangguo), and the "scientific development outlook" (kexue fazhan guan) have all adhered to this maxim. Reflecting the materialistic emphasis, science is just a means to the political end of making China powerful and prosperous, rather than a "science for Enlightenment" where the importance of science as an institution and a value system is cherished. While this highly utilitarian view of science and technology is rarely questioned, it has become clear that considerable concerns have arisen as to whether the values of science should be a source of as well as a basis for China's renaissance both in science and as a nation (Suttmeier 2011).
The Chinese Approach to Science
Science continues to gain currency in Chinese society. Reform of the science and Here, we would like to examine the types of cross-cutting issues that more explicitly reflect the actual practice of values or norms in Chinese science. We want to use the Chinese approach to reward system, misconduct in science, freedom of inquiry, and most importantly, the autonomy of the scientific community to exemplify whether and how China's pursuit of science may be at the expense of institutional mandate and normative requirement of science, which may in turn hurt China's chance of becoming a truly scientific superpower.
Reward System
Like other institutions, science has developed an elaborate system for allocating rewards -from publications, citations, grants, promotions, membership in honorific societies, to awards such as the Nobel Prize -to those who achieve the originality and novelty in knowledge production. While stimulating scientific progress, the reward system incentives scientists to pursue excellent at the research frontier.
Nowadays, Chinese institutions of learning put a premium on publishing in international journals catalogued by the Science Citation Index and stipulate rewards accordingly. Unfortunately, the number of papers and where the papers were published are more important than the peer review process. Outsourcing the peer-judged and meritocratic reward system internationally may not be in China's best interests, but this does reflect a lack of confidence within the scientific community in carrying out a fair and impartial assessment. Doing so would not necessarily prevent non-academic factors from getting involved. In practice, regulations could be ignored or interpreted arbitrarily. For example, seniority from time to time overrides achievements; it is not rare that promotion committee members are bribed; personal relations (guanxi), affection (renqing) or face (mianzi) are important considerations; and scientist-turned-administrators are rewarded more favorably.
Such deviance from the values and practices of science has its historical root in China, albeit in very different ways. Awards could be used to serve purpose other than rewarding scientists for their achievements. For example, one of the first-class prizes of the 1956 Natural Science Award, China's first, went to the aeronautics scientist Qian Xuesen who later led China's missile and space program. According to the initial prize rules, the award would not consider work achieved abroad. But a special case was made to include Qian, who returned from the United States in 1955, as an awardee for his 1954 book, Engineering Cybernetics.
Measured solely on quality, Qian's work deserved the award, but the decision went beyond the award itself: the government wanted to use it as a gesture to attract more returnees (Li 1995). a result, there has been a mania toward yuanshi. Some provinces and danwei use higher salaries, lucrative start-up packages, relocation help, and housing to lure yuanshi and even make concurrent appointments to raise their interests, hoping that associations with these names bring in fame and gain. Some candidates for the membership launch public relation campaigns to promote themselves, turning the election that is supposed to involve existing yuanshi only into one in which candidates play active roles. With the huge benefits inherent in the yuanshi title, it is also not rare that institutions of learning promote their candidates.
Worse, cliques have formed among some yuanshi who effectively block others from entering the elite rank, as was the case in the 2011 CAS membership election.
While the elitism, which is still new to China, reflects the strengthening of values such as meritocracy and academic autonomy, some yuanshi utilize their status to engage in activities that compromise these values. A considerable number of them, due to their arrogant, overweening, and supercilious behavior, are called "academic hegemons" (xueba).
Colleagues have to surrender first or corresponding authorship to them even they do not contribute to the work. Because of the unintended consequences, the elite membership has seen the reputation damaged, which also explains why there have been calls to overhaul, if not abolish, the yuanshi institution.
Attitude toward Scientific Misconduct
Closely related to the problematic reward system is the widespread of scientific misconduct or fraud in China. In early 2010, The Lancet and Nature, two leading international science journals, published editorial and news respectively, condemning a case in which scientists at China's Jinggangshan University withdrew some 70 papers submitted to Acta Crystallographica Section E for fabrication and urging strongly that China take action to clean house (The Lancet 2010; Qiu 2010). The case indicates that misconduct must have been more serious than any observer of Chinese science could imagine as such an unknown thirdtier institution as Jinggangshan University in inland China has got the international scrutiny. Burned in these statistics are some notorious cases. One such case that is particularly worth mentioning is the horrendous "Hanxin" digital signal processing chip scandal that shocked the Chinese as well as the international scientific community (Barboza 2006) . In early 2006, Chen Jin, a computer scientist at Shanghai Jiaotong University and a returnee from the United States, was found to have fooled his university, experts who had appraised his "achievements," and government agencies that had allocated hundreds of millions to his research for more than three years by using the fake chips. In fact, the so-called "Hanxin" chips, which Chen claimed to have broken the foreign dominance so as to become a star scientist and even a national hero, were simply bought from Motorola with the original logo scratched off and replaced with his owns. When someone from his group blew the whistle on the Internet, which then proved to be true, Chen was merely deprived of all the honors showered on him and positions at the university and elsewhere. He was not investigated for cheating and possible criminal activities. By contrast, a fellow Korean cheater Hwang Woosuk was given a two-year suspended prison sentence by the Seoul Central District Court after being found guilty of embezzlement and ethical violations short of fraud. Nor have there been investigations into the role played by the appraisers of Chen's "achievements," the wrongdoing by organizations that had given him numerous awards, and the negligence of government agencies that used public expenditure to support to Chen and his projects.
Sociologically, the fraudulent behavior of scientists is attributed to individual's disordered emotions and mentality, conflicts between ethical standards of conduct and a desire to attain status, and alienation from the social organization for ambivalent behavior For example, with an emphasis of publications in SCI journals, or international publications, Chinese institutions of learning have placed more emphasis on quantity, and assessed, promoted, and rewarded their scientists accordingly. When a scientist has difficulty fulfilling the required quantity legitimately, he or she is likely to divide the research into "the least publishable unit," or even take a detour. The societal expectations for Chinese scientists have been on the rise as well. Having in recent years increased its investment in research and development very substantially, the government inevitably has hoped for "visible" outcomes -for example, a Nobel Prize in science in twenty years (Cao 2004b ) -coming from some of the leading scientists, which may have further fueled the growing misconduct.
While some of the fraudulent scientists have been caught just because they were "unlucky," arguably many worse cases may have not been revealed (Barboza 2006) . More problematically, the institutional watchdog responsible for exposing, investigating, and punishing deviance cases exits on paper only. Since 2005, the National Natural Science Foundation of China has disclosed misconduct cases, including unattributed quotes, plagiarism, falsifying signatures on grant proposals, fabricating credentials and scientific data, and violating application procedures to gain access to funding. Conspicuously, the MOST that distributes more significant public research funds has never disclosed any such case, let alone punished scientists for misconduct. This practice of creating a government agency under CCP control to discipline scientists while denying their autonomy to self-discipline, plus the lack of vigorous peer review and an open press, as in the West, represents a failure of governance in Chinese science.
Meanwhile, it is extremely difficult to sanction high-profile scientists, because of the interference from both the scientists who have committed the fraud and the political leadership who has made them eminent in the first place. For example, the failure to denounce the involvement of Chen Zhangliang, then vice president of Peking University, one of China's most prestigious universities, in a plagiarism case in the mid-1990s set a very terrible example and opened the floodgates for large numbers of other scientific fraud cases involving high-profile scientists (Li and Xiong 1996) . 3 In the most recent case, He Haibo, a junior scientist at Zhejiang University, and Li Lianda, He's advisor, a CAE member at the Chinese Academy of Traditional Medicine who was also concurrently dean of pharmacology at Zhejiang University, were implicated for plagiarism in several withdrawn papers that they 
Freedom of Inquiry
Freedom of inquiry is at the core of modern science and the key to "make for" greatness in science. Though contested, freedom of inquiry is essential to the mission of Genuine academic discussions and debates are rare. In 2004, amid the MLP drafting, both Chinese scientists inside and outside China criticized the national R&D programs biased and inefficient, lacking in transparency, too often subject to the preferences of government officials rather than scientists, and operated as in the planned economy. As the pursuit of mega-programs that the MLP envisaged might divert resources from programs supporting bottom-up, investigator-driven projects which often produce more original research, they argued for changing the ways of organizing and funding such programs (Cyranoski 2004; Poo 2004; Rao, Lu, and Tsou 2004) . But the particular issue of "China Voice II," a Chinese language supplement to Nature, the leading international journal of science, which carried the criticism, was not allowed to be distributed in China with the excuse that a map of China in the issue did not include Taiwan (Nature 2005). In 2005, a proposal to hold a symposium on the reform of China's science and technology system to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the reform was also suppressed. All this has postponed the reform of the problematic system for seven years until recently when its proper function is in jeopardy.
Finally, in early 2012, Science and Culture Review, a bimonthly CAS publication, had to destroy copies of its February issue and reprinted it as the leading article in the original one pointed out that the elite yuanshi institution is facing "a crisis of trust," an unfortunate truth.
Autonomy of the Scientific Community
While it is true that science does not operate in a completely autonomous social and political milieu, the extent to which the problems confronting science in China, discussed above, is attributable to the lack of a genuinely autonomous scientific community in China or the lack of sense of a scientific community (Suttmeier 1987). For one, although China in the reform and open-door era has witnessed the decline of the overwhelming role of danwei in the provision of social services and benefits, this does not fundamentally change the relationship of employees to danwei, which still has leverage to reward or punish its employees, including scientists. Given that, an ordinary scientist may be unwilling, or at least reluctant, to involve too much in activities outside danwei, including those organized by an academic society that is composed of more peers than colleagues in the same danwei. The academic society also may not provide the kind of services and support that its members need or look for. These in turn and inevitably prevent the scientific community from playing a more active role in China. 1958 (Wang, Shen, and Gao 1994: 16-29) . During their evolution, however, Chinese professional societies gradually lost their independence.
Nowadays, an academic society, like any non-government organizations in China, has to find a sponsor, usually a government agency or institution, in order to register legally. The academic society also depends upon such an affiliation for funding as philanthropic interests in educational, cultural, and scientific causes are only just emerging. Moreover, the academic society is likely led by a professional-turned-bureaucrat or a retired bureaucrat to chart and steer its political trajectory. In fact, the higher the administrative rank of a society's leadership, the more important the society is, the higher the possibility of access to resources, and as a result the less autonomous it becomes. This explains why the CAST, an umbrella organization of Chinese academic societies as well as various associations of science and technology (kexie), equivalent to some extent to the AAAS, 6 has been led by a vice chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, China's highest state organ and legislature. Moreover, despite its claimed grassroots, academic, public-goods, non-profit, and non-government characteristics, the entire kexie system from the CAST at the central level down to a district also represents another channel through which the CCP exerts its leadership over China's scientific enterprise (CAST 2005) . It is no surprise that there is a party apparatus throughout, no different from any other Chinese organization. In fact, the day-today operation is run by the party secretary who is likely to be a member of the CCP Central
Committee, while the CAST as a whole is under the direct leadership of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee with a Politburo member in charge. All these determine the interdependence between the academic society and the state and especially the party, which controls the kexie system and indeed entire scientific enterprise.
That said, this does not mean that China's academic societies have no room to maneuver. The CAST has tried to be visible and relevant in Chinese science, at least on the academic side. It has proposed and indeed convened its annual conference since 1999 at various Chinese cities on various themes, following the model of the AAAS annual conference. China's academic societies also have tried to advocate for self governance and maintenance of integrity in research. For example, at the turn of the century, in response to a debate whether nuclei acid functions as a nutrition, the Chinese Society of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology stipulated that its members should neither publish articles in newspapers nor give opinions that could be used as advertisement nor participate in business activities in the name of the society as some of its members had done (Tsou 2001). In recent years, the CAST has been actively voicing the concerns of its constituents based on surveys and internal studies and informing China's scientific and political leadership of the challenges in science and innovation. However, the CAST and its affiliated societies could only "fly within a birdcage" or act according to the rules set by their political patron. They are unable to take an independent stand in, say, fighting against misconduct in science, as discussed, even if the involving some leading scientists at China's top universities and research institutes have raised public concerns over and international attention to the supervision and governance of research activities. Indeed, how the big economic and political dilemmas facing Chinese science are solved is inextricably bound up with social questions of trust, governance, and values.
With a more pragmatic approach, China values science, but does not necessarily accept the values of science, which could be detrimental for its ambitions, including being awarded the Nobel Prize in science and becoming a real scientific power. Underlining the prize and indeed modern science is not merely methodology and materialism but culture, which, in Merton's systematic perspective of science, discussed at the outset, is higher on the value proposition of science. Although the values themselves have changed over time, the core that remains includes truth-seeking, intellectual curiosity, challenging authority, and above all, freedom of inquiry. And such practices as reward system, integrity in research, and autonomy of the scientific community reflect and enforce these values, whose universal observation has to be sustained across the system of science and followed by scientists all over the world. It is in this sense that there is no such thing as the "Chinese" science, "American" science or "French" science, or the science with "Chinese," "American," or "French" characteristics.
managing to achieve impactful breakthroughs, reflected in a series of Nobel Prizes, which in turn pleased the political leadership, including Stalin, to reward the scientific community and tolerate the criticism brought by elite scientists such as Ivan Pavlov, Lev Landau, and Piotr Kapitza on communist policies. While the Soviet case may lend some support to the alternative model of doing "good" science, the emphasis here is the fact that some of the norms of science were preserved. And given their wisdom and tradition in knowledge production, Soviet scientists could have definitely done better in a more liberal environment.
Unfortunately, China's scientific and political leadership did not learn this lesson from the Soviet experience.
In his editorial for Science, the leading international science magazine, Ismail Serageldin, director of Egypt's Library of Alexandria, laments:
As the British scientist Jacob Bronowski observed more than half a century ago, the enterprise of science requires the adoption of certain values that are adhered to by its practitioners with exceptional rigor. These values also provide the basis for enhancing human capabilities and human welfare. Truth and honor are of the utmost importance. Any scientist who manufactures data risks being ostracized indefinitely from the scientific community, and he or she jeopardizes the credibility of science for the larger society. A scientist may err in interpreting data, but no one can accept the fabrication of data. … Science requires the freedom to enquire, to challenge, to think, to imagine the unimagined. It cannot function within the arbitrary limits of convention, nor can it flourish if it is forced to shy away from challenging the accepted. 
